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SEEKING SUNLIGHT IN SANTA FE’S SHADOW: 
THE SEC’S PURSUIT OF MANAGERIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
DONALD C. LANGEVOORT* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Largely as a result of the explosive growth in the study of international 
and comparative capital marketplace law, scholars have given securities 
regulation an extraordinary amount of good press recently.1 Bernie Black has 
drawn from this literature to conclude that a strong legal disclosure regime is 
a “core institution” required for broad-based stock ownership.2 If one recalls 
that in the late 1960s and early 1970s many scholars derided the task of 
promoting corporate disclosure through law as either unnecessary or 
counterproductive, this turnabout is particularly remarkable. 
This literature has another striking feature. Much of this scholarly 
applause for “transparency” comes because it is an effective strategy for 
promoting good corporate governance. Jack Coffee, for example, writes 
about the world-wide convergence of corporate law largely through the 
harmonization of disclosure requirements as a matter of securities law.3 The 
insight here, as Louis Brandeis predicted, is that in most cultural and 
economic settings managers behave better in the glare of sunlight.4 In this 
frame, mandatory disclosure and antifraud enforcement are part and parcel of 
the overarching effort to control agency costs. To be sure, these same truth-
telling strategies have other crucial functions as well, particularly the more 
conventional goal of helping investors make prudent investment decisions by 
providing them with high quality information. These are not inconsistent 
 
 
 * Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This project was supported by the 
Georgetown-Sloan Program on Business Institutions. Thanks to Cindy Williams, Mitu Gulati, and the 
participants at the ILEP/Washington University School of Law Symposium on Corporate 
Accountability for helpful comments, and to Heather Hathaway for excellent research assistance. 
 1. See, e.g., Rafael LaPorta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 
(1997); Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishey, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997). 
 2. Bernard S. Black, The Core Institutions that Support Strong Securities Markets, 55 BUS. 
LAW. 1565, 1571 (2000). See also Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for 
Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 808 (2001). 
 3. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in 
Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641 (1999). See also Merritt Fox, 
Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 113 (1999). 
 4. Brandeis said “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient 
policeman.” LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 92 (1932). 
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goals, however. Corporate accountability via transparency is simply the 
current point of emphasis. 
This revisionism is important because it speaks to one of the long-
standing and most contentious issues in the history of American securities 
regulation: whether corporate and securities law should be seen as separate 
spheres, or whether instead they are part of a unitary enterprise that neither 
can nor should be divided. The former view invokes federalism as its code 
word and tries to confine the ability of securities regulation to participate 
liberally in setting standards of fiduciary responsibility. This is the idea that a 
plurality of the Supreme Court tried to express in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. 
Green,5 for example. The latter view—bolstered by the current thinking—
sees securities regulation largely as one of many forms of corporate law. This 
idea has an intellectual pedigree going back to William Cary, if not further.6 
Securities and corporate law have coordinate and complimentary jurisdiction 
over the control of agency costs in the public corporation, without much of 
substantial importance—or any strong reason—to delimit the power of 
either, so long as there is some connection to the duty of candor. 
My aim in this paper is not to justify at length an expansive “new 
corporation law” perspective, though I do believe in it. Nor do I want to try to 
resolve a controversial question that the new learning admittedly leaves open: 
which jurisdictional body should set the disclosure and antifraud standards 
insofar as they are designed to promote better corporate governance? To say 
that corporate and securities law are largely unitary does not necessarily 
mean that centralization of authority in the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC or Commission) is the right choice. Perhaps the states,7 
foreign countries,8 or stock exchanges9 would do better, justifying a narrow 
scope to federal securities law. I happen to favor centralization,10 but will not 
seek to justify that preference here, either. Instead, I want to focus largely on 
the question of strategic behavior by the SEC. Assuming that the 
 
 
 5. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
 6. See Arthur Fleischer, Jr., “Federal Corporation Law”: An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 
1146, 1146 n.2 (1965); Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1993). 
 7. See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 
107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998). 
 8. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the 
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998). 
 9. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Allocation of Government Authority: The Exchange as Regulator, 
83 VA. L. REV. 1453 (1997); A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class 
Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925 (1999). 
 10. My views are similar to those expressed, for example, in James D. Cox, Premises for 
Reforming the Regulation of Securities Offerings: An Essay, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11 (2000). 
See Donald C. Langevoort, Deconstructing Section 11: Public Offering Liability in a Continuous 
Disclosure Environment, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45 (2000). 
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p449 Langevoort.doc  12/20/2001   9:06 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
2001] THE SEC AND MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 451 
 
 
 
 
Commission desires relatively free reign to pursue corporate accountability, 
how, within its current statutory authority, does it act in so doing? How can it 
best enlist the cooperation of other actors whose influence in this area is also 
important? In other words, how can it leverage its authority in order to 
maximize its influence, given whatever limitations in authority and resources 
might exist? 
Initially, this inquiry will be into the state of the law. A conventional 
view—enshrined in Santa Fe, and later expressed vigorously in cases like 
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., Inc.11 and Business Roundtable v. SEC12—
espouses that there is an important doctrinal line of demarcation between the 
spheres of corporate governance and securities regulation, one dealing with 
substantive regulation and the other with disclosure. Most significantly, these 
cases and their echoes in the contemporary case law suggest that “mere” 
breaches of fiduciary duty and corporate mismanagement are not properly 
something that securities law (and hence the SEC) should seek to remedy. 
This line of authority is invoked when the SEC tries to push hard in the 
governance area and at least potentially constrains the Commission.  
Admittedly, Santa Fe’s reading of the securities laws states an important 
doctrinal principle. The SEC cannot adopt a federal version of a state 
corporation code or pursue breaches that are wholly without deception.13 
Aligned with many others in the “new corporation law” camp, however, I 
have long suspected that this line is conceptually (if not ideologically) 
overdrawn. There are not many instances of governance abuse that are 
disclosed with complete candor. Hidden breaches of fiduciary obligation can 
almost always be characterized in terms of fraud or misrepresentation.  
Part II explores this battleground. If the SEC is to have the freedom to 
pursue managerial accountability, it needs the cooperation of the judiciary. 
The courts, essentially, have to be enlisted as the Commission’s agents in 
overcoming whatever formalistic distinctions appear in the law’s text. But 
Santa Fe, Panter, and Business Roundtable are highly salient symbols of 
resistance, rather than cooperation. Our first task, then, is to take a current 
inventory of how the federalism metaphor has played out in the courts. What 
does the word “mere” mean when we speak of fiduciary breaches and 
mismanagement allegations? Is there any principled justification for 
restraining a federally enforceable duty of candor with respect to fiduciary 
breaches? 
 
 
 11. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981). 
 12. 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 13. See Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977). 
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The findings are decidedly mixed. The federalism metaphor lives and has 
force. However, I want to show that the metaphor is often just window 
dressing for what are really fairly standard decisions under the prevailing law 
relating to the “duty to disclose.” There is a strong basis for a disclosure duty 
in many recent skirmishes that represent important victories for a broad view 
of the federal role. This suggests that the inflated rhetoric one sees in the 
citations to Santa Fe, when there really is a more narrow basis on which the 
case could be decided, reflects more the ideological preference for weak 
securities law as it relates to corporate governance than a compelling 
doctrinal construct. While this sort of strict constructionism is not entirely 
without intellectual respectability,14 it easily becomes a cover for rent-
seeking by corporate managers simply wishing to expand or protect their 
autonomy, and the Commission should resist this practice without apology. 
If the law, then, is no more than a mild constraint on the SEC, what else 
limits its ability to pursue corporate accountability aggressively? Part III 
starts from the premise that there are severe practical limitations on the tools 
and resources available to the Commission to enforce its authority. The 
enforcement staff is far too small, and the remedies available to the 
Commission are too confined to overcome deficiencies in detection and 
prosecution. The historically favored supplement, private securities litigation, 
is hobbled partly by its own internally generated costs and partly by 
legislative and judicial encumbrances. This part examines how the SEC tries 
to overcome these deterrence limitations. Most significantly, the Commission 
has focused more and more of its attention recently on gatekeeper strategies, 
seeking to enlist lawyers, directors, and especially accountants as its agents in 
the battle. While there is room to maneuver here, we should not be surprised 
by the extent to which predictable traits of human nature make deterrence by 
both insiders and gatekeepers more difficult than expected. 
The primary message of Parts II and III is that the SEC must pursue the 
battle for compliance with corporate accountability standards on two distinct 
levels. One is direct lawmaking and law enforcement. This, as we have seen, 
is severely constrained by lack of resources and the resistance of human 
nature, if not by law. To compensate, the SEC must more carefully express 
the legitimacy of what it does in a way that makes both the courts and 
 
 
 14. See sources supra notes 7-9. See generally Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a 
Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047 (1995). As I read Mahoney and the others, they 
essentially agree that disclosure is a sound mechanism for controlling agency costs—indeed, it is the 
essential purpose of the regime of securities law—but doubt that the SEC is well-suited to perform this 
task efficiently. The common theme here is that the SEC is overly insulated from competition and 
hence becomes unresponsive to cost-benefit considerations. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss2/2
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significant actors, such as corporate officers and directors, accountants, and 
lawyers, more willing accomplices in the effort. As Part VI will show, this 
expressive task is not easy at all. Both the ideology and the self-interest of 
some actors rest on denigrating the legitimacy of the SEC’s policing efforts. 
Moreover, the Commission may find itself in a conflicted situation: the kinds 
of expressive and rhetorical actions that help it gain political resources in the 
public realm may compromise its ability to gain cooperation and compliance 
within the regulated community. Regulation FD is an illustration of this.15 
This Article ends with some thoughts about building a more powerful “brand 
message” for securities regulation, tying this effort back to the new agency 
cost literature. 
II. SANTA FE’S SHADOW: TESTING THE FEDERALISM CONSTRAINT 
A. SEC Rules 
SEC disclosure rules seek to promote corporate accountability in two 
ways. One is by forcing issuers to disclose their financial performance in 
accord with generally accepted accounting principles on a quarterly basis. 
Plainly, this motivates managers to achieve the kind of performance that 
pleases investors. While this discipline may have its downside—it may, for 
example, cause an obsession with short-term earnings to the exclusion of less 
readily measurable items of economic value, and tempt managers to skew the 
reported data in the form of fraud or “earnings management”—the prevailing 
view is highly supportive of this strategy.16 Santa Fe has no plausible 
influence here. The SEC’s authority under section 13(a) gives it free reign to 
implement whatever measures of financial performance it wishes. 
The second mechanism to promote corporate accountability is by 
requiring disclosure of discrete events or other facts that shareholders would 
presumably consider important regarding the management of the company.17 
Part IV of Regulation S-K (and S-B for small business issuers) requires 
disclosure of a number of facts that touch on management’s character, 
competence, and conflicting interests, such as pending litigation, executive 
compensation, self-dealing transactions, and so forth.18 The compensation 
 
 
 15. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100-103 (2000). 
 16. See generally Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You 
Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1342 (1996). 
 17. On the scope of the SEC’s rulemaking authority to determine how broadly investor (or other 
social) interests might extend, see Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and 
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999). 
 18. Management and Certain Security Holders, 17 C.F.R. § 229.400 (2000). 
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disclosure requirements of Item 402 reveal one place where the Commission 
has plainly tried to have an effect on primary behavior, with almost a 
“shaming” objective as compensation measures are displayed adjacent to 
performance results.19 Whether this works is another question entirely; it has 
as likely fueled the upward spiral in salaries as operated as a check.20 As 
discussed below, human nature responds differently to disclosure rules than 
we often predict. 
Potentially, disclosure requirements relating to governance-facts are more 
of a federalist battleground, although the Commission’s authority to adopt 
disclosure rules in the corporate governance area has not yet been seriously 
challenged. Nonetheless, complaints are occasionally heard that the SEC is 
“overstepping” the dividing line between corporate and securities law when 
new initiatives are proposed. What is striking, however, is the relative 
shyness with which the Commission has approached rulemaking on the 
governance front. Quite plausibly, it could try to do far more than it has done 
to force the disclosure of matters touching on fiduciary responsibility, both in 
the general reporting obligations under section 13(a) and in connection with 
proxy solicitations under section 14(a). It also has largely unexplored 
definitional powers, both with respect to fraud under section 10(b)21 and—in 
something that could be a potent intrusion into corporate governance 
matters—the question of what constitutes a reasonable system of internal 
controls under section 13(b)(2).  
Precisely why the Commission hasn’t pursued a more aggressive 
accountability agenda is complicated. One reason, no doubt, is a lack of 
resources to police any expanded sphere of disclosure. As we shall pursue 
more fully in Part III, the Commission has too much to do, with too few 
resources. Disclosure is also an area of significant resistance from the 
business community, and the SEC may have other fights on which it would 
rather spend its scarce political capital.22 Third, there is an historic preference 
for using enforcement actions generally to push its agenda, rather than 
 
 
 19. Executive Compensation, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2000). 
 20. See John Bizjak et al., Has the Use of Peer Groups Contributed to Higher Levels of 
Executive Compensation?, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=252544 (last 
visited May 17, 2001). 
 21. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities 
Laws: The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1994) (exploring rulemaking authority 
so as to limit private enforceability). 
 22. The SEC’s enforcement history under section 13(b)(2) is fairly clear in demonstrating the 
fear of provoking a reaction based on the claim of too great an incursion into corporate governance. 
See Exchange Act Release No. 17500, 21 SEC Docket 1466 (Jan. 29, 1981). For some of the criticism, 
see ABA Committee on Corporate Law and Accounting, A Guide to the New Section 13(b)(2) 
Accounting Requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 34 BUS. LAW. 307 (1978). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss2/2
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rulemaking. Finally, the Commission may have some doubts about its 
authority here, fearing that Santa Fe may be an implicit limitation on its 
ability to act. One purpose for the following discussion is to test whether the 
existing case law really supports this last constraint, or whether Santa Fe’s 
shadow is instead something of an optical illusion. 
One other matter relating to rulemaking in the interest of accountability is 
worth mentioning here. As the recent flurry of activity over audit committees 
makes clear,23 the Commission can move indirectly by prompting self-
regulatory organizations (SROs) to act and thus cause substantive reforms 
that very much resemble state law forms of governance rules. Business 
Roundtable limits how much muscle the Commission can put behind this 
effort, but does not prevent the result if “voluntarily” accepted by the 
SROs.24 Clearly, this route is important in the search for accountability.25 My 
one note of caution looks to the future. Listing standards—the primary 
mechanism for these indirect governance initiatives—implicitly assume 
some level of centralized trading to be effective. If trading continues to 
fragment over the next few years, the SROs will find it increasingly 
uneconomical to implement, monitor, or enforce rigorous standards. This 
difficulty, in turn, will limit the Commission’s ability to pursue this kind of 
tactic and force it toward other strategies. 
B. Enforcement 
The more common way the Commission acts in the corporate governance 
area is via enforcement. This can be as simple as pursuing a straightforward 
violation of an existing reporting rule, in which case no federalism 
constraints are present. Often, however, the Commission moves in an area 
touching on corporate governance that is less clearly defined, opening up the 
possibility of argument about crossing the line into Santa Fe’s forbidden 
world. This is a subject that began in earnest with the SEC’s administrative 
proceeding in Franchard Corp.,26 continued through the management 
integrity and corrupt practices issues of the 1970s, and remains visible today 
 
 
 23. See Audit Committee Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 42266, 71 SEC Docket 787 
(Dec. 22, 1999). For a critical view, see John F. Olson, How to Really Make Audit Committees More 
Effective, 54 BUS. LAW. 1097 (1999). 
 24. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4, 69 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 565 (1991). 
 25. See Helen S. Scott, The SEC, the Audit Committee Rules and the Marketplaces: Corporate 
Governance and the Future, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 549 (2001). 
 26. 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964). 
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in such matters as the section 21(a) report in W.R. Grace & Co.27 
There are a host of subissues raised by these kinds of cases. W.R. Grace, 
for example, is more interesting on the question of who was responsible for 
the failure to disclose a self-dealing transaction than whether there was a 
false filing in the first place. What is important for us is to push aside these 
kinds of distractions and assess the state of the law on the archetypal 
accountability question. When, if ever, is there a federal law duty to disclose 
information relating to a simple breach of fiduciary duty?  
This is Santa Fe’s domain. After Santa Fe, some kind of 
misrepresentation or nondisclosure is an essential element of any claim 
brought under Rule 10b-5 or any other “fraud” provision of the securities 
laws, for that matter. An open and notorious breach of duty does not work.28 
But as noted earlier, there is probably only a small set of cases where all the 
relevant facts going to an alleged breach are set before the shareholders in an 
open and candid fashion. The temptation to conceal or “spin” is too strong. 
Hence, my hypothesis is that this is not a severe restriction in and of itself.  
Related to this, however, is something less obvious and potentially more 
important. The law is clear that for any such case to go forward, the subject 
of the alleged nondisclosure must be the underlying facts from which the 
possibility of a breach may be inferred. With citation to Santa Fe, courts 
consistently say that corporate managers are not expected to characterize 
their actions in pejorative terms (self-accusations) or volunteer information 
about their subjective motivations.29 Because motivation—especially bad 
faith—is a key aspect of fiduciary responsibility, this could be a significant 
limit embedded in the law. But again, I suspect not. Self-serving or other 
inappropriate motivations typically lead to consequences that are covered up 
or distorted. Sadly, some plaintiff lawyers are surprisingly persistent in 
styling their claims in a way that violates this black-letter law when they 
could easily do better, and suffer accordingly in front of impatient judges. 
Judicial decisions such as these convey the impression that Santa Fe is a 
powerful force, but this is misleading. The SEC is skilled enough to avoid 
falling into this somewhat obvious trap. 
Assume, then, that a complaint properly alleges concealed facts. The 
ultimate Santa Fe question is whether there are any other policy-induced 
 
 
 27. Exchange Act Release Nos. 39156-57, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 85,963 (Sept. 30, 1997). 
 28. In United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997), the Court found the secret 
misappropriation of confidential information by a fiduciary to be a fraud in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security. 
 29. E.g., Lewis v. Chrysler Corp., 949 F.2d 644 (3d Cir. 1991); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 
646 F.2d 271, 287-89 (7th Cir. 1981); Biesenbach v. Guenther, 588 F.2d 400, 401-02 (3d Cir. 1978). 
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limitations that constrain the federal duty of candor. This question has arisen 
in settings involving the nondisclosure of illegality, breaches of the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty, and, to a far lesser extent, the duty of care. We shall proceed 
through these in order. We will then consider the hybrid problems of 
breaches of duty in merger and acquisition transactions and the issue of 
earnings management. 
Before doing that, however, we should clear up a point that, 
unfortunately, has confused some courts, and perhaps thus added to the 
doctrinal muddle. Some courts have said that the securities laws should not 
concern themselves with the disclosure of misconduct because it would not 
further the goal of providing investors with information;30 insiders willing to 
engage in the wrongdoing in the first place will simply ignore the disclosure 
obligation. But one of securities laws’ functions is to offer a remedy for 
situations where investors have been injured by the absence of the truth, 
paying more than the securities were really worth in light of the hidden facts 
or casting votes without the benefit of accurate information. That kind of 
harm deserves redress whether or not the underlying rule succeeds in forcing 
disclosure.31 Any potential overlap between the securities remedy and the 
state remedy may become relevant at the point at which a remedy must be 
chosen, but overlap is no cause for a per se dismissal of federal interest in the 
first place.  
1. Illegality 
We begin with a matter that has long fascinated scholars and 
practitioners: the nondisclosure of illegal corporate or managerial behavior. 
This has been explored exhaustively elsewhere, though less so recently.32 My 
interest in the subject here is mainly to illuminate the general substance-
disclosure conundrum.  
Most all the academic attention has been on the question of the 
materiality of unlawful behavior. To speed through this well-worn subject, 
there is general agreement that unlawful conduct that, if discovered, poses a 
significant threat to the company’s financial situation is material (so-called 
“quantitative materiality”). Craftmatic Securities Litigation v. Kraftsow33 is a 
 
 
 30. E.g., Ballan v. Wilfred Am. Educational Corp., 720 F. Supp. 241, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 31. Just as important, the distinct remedy operates as a form of additional deterrence, perhaps 
leading the actor to forego the improper activity. 
 32. For a collection of materials, see JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 106-15 (3d ed. 2001). 
 33. 890 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1989). See also SEC v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824 
(E.D. Wis. 1978). 
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useful example, where alleged violations of Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) regulations were sufficiently extensive that discovery would alter the 
company’s income stream.34 The harder question, the so-called “qualitative 
materiality” debate, is whether smaller examples of illegal behavior, such as 
commercial bribes, sufficiently cast doubt on the integrity of key corporate 
actors and would thus also be important to the reasonable investor. Splitting, 
presumably, on the question of how bottom-line oriented the average investor 
really is, some courts have said yes as a general matter,35 while others have 
said no, unless the impropriety cast down on the loyalty of the official to 
shareholder interests.36 Under the latter view, a garden-variety bribe would 
not cast such doubt, because it was presumably done to make the 
shareholders richer.  
Though this materiality issue is provocative, I have nothing to add. What 
is far more important for our purposes is the follow-up question: was there a 
violation of some disclosure duty in not revealing the misconduct, even if it 
was material? Courts sometimes confuse materiality and duty issues, 
sometimes in the direction of declaring something immaterial—even though 
shareholders would find it important—on grounds that it is not the sort of 
thing the issuer should have to disclose.37 That should be the work of the 
“duty” analysis. Materiality should be the question of what the reasonable 
investor would likely find significant, nothing more, nothing less. However, 
it is also important to avoid the converse error: assuming a duty simply 
because materiality is present.  
This point in the analysis is where the muddiness begins, and the 
muddiness is to some extent the Commission’s responsibility. During the 
1970s, in connection with the foreign bribery scandals, the SEC took an 
extraordinarily broad view of issuers’ obligations to disclose corrupt 
practices, in a way that conflated the materiality and duty prongs.38 This was 
 
 
 34. Id. at 640. 
 35. See Roeder v. Alpha Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1987). This disagreement is all 
part of the long-standing debate over “management integrity.” For a disparate set of views on this 
history, see John M. Fedders, Qualitative Materiality: The Birth, Struggles and Demise of an 
Unworkable Standard, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 41 (1998); Ralph C. Ferrara et al., Disclosure of 
Information Bearing on Management Integrity and Competency, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 555 (1981); Bevis 
Longstreth, SEC Disclosure Policy Regarding Management Integrity, 38 BUS. LAW. 1413 (1983); 
James D. Redwood, Qualitative Materiality Under the SEC Proxy Rules and the Fifth Amendment: A 
Disclosure Accident Waiting to Happen or Two Ships Passing in the Night?, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 315; 
Eric D. Roiter, Illegal Corporate Practices and the Disclosure Requirements of the Federal Securities 
Laws, 50 FORD. L. REV. 781 (1982). 
 36. See Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981).  
 37. See Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1985). 
 38. See Exchange Act Release No. 12,946, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 80,783, at 87,031 (Nov. 2, 1976). 
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not entirely unreasonable, however, because at that time there was a fair case 
to be made that those two concepts were subject to conflation.39 However, 
the law then turned. At least since Chiarella v. United States,40 it is clear that 
no duty to disclose arises simply because a trader or issuer possesses material 
nonpublic information. There must be some separate basis for the duty, and 
only a limited number of possibilities seem to exist today for imposing one.41 
Nothing in the mandatory disclosure rules compels comment on illegal 
behavior per se. Pending litigation and criminal proceedings may have to be 
disclosed, along with convictions and significant judgments.42 However, 
uncharged crimes need not be disclosed. Given that, it is hard at first glance 
to see how the company or its officers could ever violate any disclosure 
obligation by remaining silent. Indeed, this is precisely the basis on which a 
number of well-known cases involving criminal prosecutions for 
nondisclosure of uncharged crimes have absolved the defendants of 
liability.43 These cases, however, emphasize the criminal prosecution context, 
leaving open the possibility that the answer would be different in a civil case. 
Some of the heavy lifting here is done by the half-truth doctrine,44 
codified for SEC filing purposes in Rules 40845 and 12b-20.46 Once a subject 
is addressed, whether in a filing or public statements, the speaker must add 
additional material information necessary to make statements made not 
misleading.47 The question, then, becomes one of what sorts of statements 
 
 
 39. See Jeffrey D. Bauman, Rule 10b-5 and the Corporation’s Affirmative Duty to Disclose, 67 
GEO. L.J. 935 (1979). 
 40. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 41. See COX ET AL., supra note 32, at 749-54. As a general matter, the accepted duties to disclose 
under Rule 10b-5 are (1) when there is a fiduciary relationship, (2) when there is a duty to update or 
correct, or (3) when statements made operate as a half-truth. See generally Dale A. Oesterle, The 
Inexorable March Toward a Continuous Disclosure Requirement for Publicly Traded Corporations: 
Are We There Yet?, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 135 (1998). In addition, a few courts have suggested a 
“flexible duty” standard under which a duty can be implied even in the absence of any prior statement 
or fiduciary relationship. E.g., Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1329-31 (8th Cir. 1991). 
The beginning of this line pre-dates Chiarella and may simply reflect some lower courts’ 
unwillingness to reject the old case law. It also seems heavily bound up in theories of “secondary” 
liability (for example, aiding and abetting), now defunct after Central Bank of Denver v. First 
Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994). Most courts today at least implicitly reject the “flexible duty” 
approach by dismissing cases unless one of the more established duties can be found. 
 42. See Items 103 and 401(f) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.103, 229.401(f) (2000). 
 43. See United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Crop Growers 
Corp., 954 F. Supp. 335 (D.D.C. 1997). These cases are to some extent driven by Fifth Amendment 
concerns. See Redwood, supra note 35. 
 44. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences by 
Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. REV. 87 (1999). 
 45. 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (2000). 
 46. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2000). 
 47. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.408, 240.12b-20. 
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touch closely enough on the illegality to make them technically true but 
misleading. On this, Craftmatic is illustrative.48 The issuer placed great 
emphasis on its unique marketing structure in various disclosures, and the 
court found this description to be misleading without disclosing that these 
same marketing practices were in violation of FTC rules.49 Another panel of 
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit conceptualized the half-truth duty 
by saying that improper practices must be disclosed because the issuer put 
the issue of legality “in play” by virtue of what it says, triggering an 
obligation of completeness.50 
However, issuers seldom put matters of legality “in play” like that, and 
when properly applied, the half-truth doctrine is really very narrow. The 
interesting question, then, is how an issuer could ever have a duty to disclose 
the legality of its (or its managers’) behavior when there is no affirmative 
statement by the company that implies the absence of illegality. So far as the 
half-truth doctrine is concerned, at least, it seems quite a stretch to say that a 
duty to disclose illegal conduct by an officer is created simply because he or 
she has been identified as a company executive.51 The challenge is to identify 
some particular statement in a 10-K or proxy statement that becomes false 
and misleading because information about the crime has been omitted. The 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in Roeder v. Alpha Industries,52 was 
one of the first courts to insist on finding some falsity even when the crime is 
material, and deserves credit for seeing what many other courts have not. 
Once we take the duty question seriously, we run into hard questions. 
Exactly what portion of the narrative disclosure becomes false and 
misleading because of an undisclosed crime? For instance, it would take an 
overly broad view of the half-truth doctrine to say that an undisclosed 
embezzlement renders the management compensation table misleading.53 
Most intelligent readers understand the natural meaning of compensation, 
 
 
 48. See supra note 33. 
 49. Id. at 640. See also Ballan v. Upjohn Co., 814 F. Supp. 1375 (W.D. Mich. 1992); In re Par 
Pharm. Inc. Sec. Litig., 733 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 50. Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 282 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 51. The question may be more interesting if the executive is described in glowing terms in the 
company’s publicity. Does this portrayal put the legality of his or her conduct “in play”? While this 
assertion is not implausible, it is worth noting that “puffery” tends not to trigger a duty to disclose 
contemporaneous negative information. See, e.g., In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 537-
39 (3d Cir. 1999); In re Mobile Media Sec. Litig., 28 F. Supp.2d 901, 938 (D.N.J. 1998); In re Par 
Pharm. Sec. Litig., 733 F. Supp. 668, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).  
 52. 814 F.2d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 53. But see United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1978) (treating unadjudicated section 
16(b) liability as a debt to the corporation with respect to the line items requiring such disclosure in 
proxy statements). The stretching of the line item requirements to create a duty to disclose is observed 
in Ferrara et al., supra note 35. 
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and it does not include ill-gotten gains. Finding the half-truth is all the harder 
when the crime is not self-serving. And this legal problem is not limited to 
the juicy qualitative materiality questions. Duty can be problematic with 
respect to quantitative materiality as well. Suppose that a material portion of 
a company’s income is tainted by its association with commercial bribery. It 
is still income. The response, typically, is that this current financial 
performance is put at risk by the possibility that the illegality will be detected 
and the profits recouped or foreclosed in the future by some restraint on the 
business. But this kind of concern is conventionally one for the footnotes to 
the financial statements (contingent liabilities) or the Management 
Discussion & Analysis, which is limited in terms of matters “likely” to come 
to pass. While a few decisions properly take the analysis through these sorts 
of questions,54 others still decide the case one way or another based largely 
on the materiality of what was concealed.55 
My point here is a simple one. The doctrinal question of whether illegality 
must be disclosed often becomes difficult when we get to the duty prong. 
Courts that insist on such disclosure are implicitly either stretching the half-
truth doctrine to force exposure of something because of its perceived 
materiality, or assuming some other basis for the duty to disclose. In the next 
subsection, we will consider another “duty” possibility—fiduciary 
obligation—that actually works well in many instances, and which goes a 
long way toward explaining the illegality cases in which violations of Rule 
10b-5 or Rule 14a-9 are found. For now, let us at least put on the table the 
possibility that what courts are doing when they refuse to compel disclosure 
of illegal conduct is simply recognizing that the affirmative duty to disclose 
is generally quite limited under the federal securities laws. With that in mind, 
we shall move on to a related subject, where this issue explicitly confronts 
the rhetoric of Santa Fe. 
2. Breaches of Loyalty and Conflicts of Interest 
By far, the most important question relating to corporate accountability 
has to do with self-interested, but not otherwise illegal, behavior by corporate 
officials. In essence, this is what the agency cost problem is all about, and the 
new corporate governance literature says that disclosure plays an important 
 
 
 54. See United States v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1290-91 (9th Cir. 1996), for a good example of a 
court doing this. The difficult question here, even under a simple materiality emphasis, is predicting 
the probability that the illegality would be detected as of the time of the alleged omission, and then 
balancing that against the magnitude of the impact. 
 55. E.g., Weisberg v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 609 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1979); Shields v. Erikson, 
[1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 94,723 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 1989). 
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role in deterring it. Does it follow, then, that failure to disclose information 
relating to fiduciary breaches involving the duty of loyalty are actionable per 
se? Based on what we learned in the previous subsection, no. The inquiry has 
to address both materiality and duty. With respect to materiality, the analysis 
is usually easy. If the executive is key enough, hidden conflicts and selfish 
behavior are important to the reasonable investor. This issue was the focus in 
Franchard. As such, materiality is rarely as difficult as it was in the illegality 
context, where the battle is fought over the line between selfish and 
nonselfish acts. 
Duty, once again, is harder. Fortunately, Item 404 of Regulation S-K, 
reincorporated into the proxy statement instructions, creates an unambiguous 
obligation to disclose self-dealing transactions, the most obvious kind of 
loyalty issue.56 However, agency cost theorists would quickly point out that 
Item 404 hardly exhausts the universe. The usurpation of corporate 
opportunities, misappropriation of corporate property, and unfair competition 
are examples of other forms of managerial opportunism in the day-to-day 
corporate world.57 When these are at issue, or when the nondisclosure of 
traditional self-dealing arises in the contexts not involving SEC filings, we 
have to work harder to find a disclosure obligation. 
This is where Santa Fe comes into play in an interesting fashion, and it is 
worth revisiting its history before coming back to the agency cost problem 
directly.58 The case itself dealt with the “going private” phenomenon, and the 
question of whether inadequate value offered to shareholders was actionable 
for that reason alone. The Court’s answer was no, there must be deception. 
We know from the now lengthy subsequent history of that phenomenon, 
however, that some kind of concealment is commonplace in going private 
transactions that are truly opportunistic. Indeed, the SEC quickly intervened 
on this particular issue by mandating disclosure in Rule 13e-3 that makes it 
all but impossible to execute an unfair freeze-out without violating a federal 
disclosure requirement.59 Thus, Santa Fe is no longer directly of much 
interest in going private deals. 
 
 
 56. Certain Relationships and Related Transactions, 17 C.F.R. § 229.404 (2000). 
 57. An issue that has gathered much attention along these lines is the disclosure of corporate 
charitable contributions, under circumstances where the charitable institution may be affiliated with an 
insider. See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of 
Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579 (1997). 
 58. For some of the “prehistory” here, see James D. Cox, Fraud is in the Eyes of the Beholder: 
Rule 10b-5’s Application to Acts of Corporate Mismanagement, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 674 (1972). 
 59. See Ralph C. Ferrara & Marc I. Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule 10b-5 and the 
New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263, 272-73 n.49 (1980). The judiciary has been fairly 
cooperative in enforcing this federalization. E.g., Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 826 F.2d 1470 (6th 
Cir. 1987). 
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A subsequent use to which Santa Fe was put is the situation posed by the 
famous case of Goldberg v. Meridor.60 Suppose company insiders engineer a 
purchase or sale of securities where they stand on one side, the company on 
the other. Assuming that allegedly unfair terms were concealed from the 
shareholders, is there any cause of action under Rule 10b-5? Goldberg said 
yes, the shareholders were deceived out of their ability to pursue a derivative 
action remedying the apparent breach of duty. Other courts, especially in the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, have said no, rejecting the notion 
that lost state law remedies are ever within the ambit of the federal securities 
laws,61 clearly a Santa Fe-driven insight. But we should understand this issue 
carefully, for it deals with the very narrow question of whether: (1) it is 
meaningful to say that the fictional personage of the corporation is deceived 
whenever its insiders cause a purchase or sale of securities on concealed 
unfair terms62 and (2) if so, whether nontrading shareholders have a right to 
bring suit for the nondisclosure based on a loss of state remedies. This 
question is perplexing not simply because of concerns about federalism, but 
because a line of precedent under Rule 10b-5 insists that private plaintiffs be 
actual purchasers or sellers of securities.63 The precedent introduces a 
distraction on which Santa Fe may have something to say, but is complicated 
even in the absence of any federalism concerns. It would be a much more 
straightforward matter if purchasers of the company’s stock (or the SEC) 
were the ones bringing suit based on an insufficiently or completely 
undisclosed purchase of stock by insiders. There, they would be alleging 
 
 
 60. 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977). For a more recent endorsement, see Estate of Soler v. 
Rodriguez, 63 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 61. See Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Ellis, 810 F.2d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 1987). Short of outright 
rejection of the “right to sue” possibility, many courts have struggled toward a middle ground by 
permitting the suit in theory, but being strict about how clear it has to be that a breach occurred or that 
a remedy would be granted. See Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938, 947-50 (2d Cir. 1988). In the proxy 
area, this question has rearisen in situations where proxies are solicited by the shareholders who lack 
the votes to block the majority’s will. See Virginia Bankshares Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 
(1991); Scattergood v. Perleman, 945 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 62. The conceptual difficulty was well put many years ago by litigator Vernon Patrick, who 
wrote, “[I]t is as difficult to conceive of a corporation being ‘deceived’ as to imagine a corporation 
being in love.” Vernon Patrick, Rule 10b-5, Equitable Fraud and Schoebaum v. Firstbrook: Another 
Step in the Continuing Development of Federal Corporation Law, 21 ALA. L. REV. 457, 469 (1969). 
 63. My sense is that Goldberg is right, and that the emphasis on lost state law remedies is really a 
distraction. The legal question should simply be whether the corporation was deceived when the 
insiders engineered the transaction after breaching their duty of loyalty. This question requires resort to 
agency law principles, but that is not unusual for federal securities litigation. If it makes sense to say 
that there was deceit practiced on the corporation, then it is a simple and conventional matter to let the 
shareholders sue derivatively. The Supreme Court’s insider trading discussion in United States v. 
O’Hagan offers assistance to the claim of fraud on a corporation from the hidden selfishness of its 
insiders. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).  
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what is clearly an investment-related injury. The only questions should then 
be materiality and the duty to disclose.64  
Putting Goldberg aside, the more basic question asks under what 
circumstances can the SEC or trading shareholders bring suit when insiders 
breach their duty of loyalty in some fashion (which may or may not involve 
trading in securities), and the facts are not fully disclosed? This question is 
the Santa Fe issue that is of most interest to the Commission, and courts have 
treated it explicitly as a difficult federalism problem. Rather unhelpfully, for 
example, one court has described the test after Santa Fe in the following 
terms: “Where the incremental value of disclosure is solely to place potential 
investors on notice that management is culpable of a breach of faith or 
incompetence, the failure to disclose does not violate the securities acts.”65 
To make this inquiry more specific, suppose the chief executive officer of a 
company secretly sets up a controlled, family-owned firm that takes an 
opportunity within the company’s line of business. The argument for a 
securities law violation is fairly straightforward. If management integrity 
means anything, this kind of breach surely is material.  
At least one court66 has cited Santa Fe for the proposition that a 
usurpation of corporate opportunity need not be disclosed because it belongs 
in the “corporate law” side of the legal divide.67 This suggests that federalism 
is indeed a trump card, barring claims that otherwise have all the elements of 
a good cause of action. But note something about the facts of the case: 
nothing that the company or its officer said in any filing or voluntary 
disclosure put the corporate opportunity question “in play,” and there was no 
shareholder involvement in the decision that required a proxy statement. 
Dismissal of the case could thus separately be justified on the grounds that 
there was no duty to speak to the shareholders, eliminating the need for any 
invocation of Santa Fe.68  
While this is a plausible application of the law, there are many other cases 
that do impose disclosure obligations regarding potential managerial 
misconduct, without identifying any half-truth. Some of these involve 
crimes,69 others noncriminal (but usually self-serving) misconduct.70 Perhaps 
 
 
 64. From the SEC’s perspective, the matter is made easier by the fact that disclosure of the terms 
and conditions are required in the company’s periodic filing. Were there any concealed facts there, the 
enforcement action would be straightforward. 
 65. Craftmatic, 890 F.2d at 640. 
 66. Ciro Inc. v. Gold, 816 F. Supp. 253 (D. Del. 1993).  
 67. Id. at 262-64. 
 68. Being a derivative suit, Ciro falls into the lost state remedies category, making it slightly off-
point. See supra text accompanying notes 60-62. 
 69. See supra note 55. 
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the most important illustration of this is the fairly consistent body of case law 
forcing disclosure of hidden conflicts of interest in proxy cases. If lack of 
duty is such a serious bar to so many claims, how do these courts find it?  
Unfortunately, most pay little attention to the issue. One of the leading 
cases on disclosure of conflicts of interests in shareholder voting decisions, 
Kas v. Financial General Bankshares, Inc.,71 contains a thoughtful 
discussion of the Santa Fe question in holding that nondisclosed facts 
relating to a conflict of interest transaction are subject to a duty of disclosure, 
thereby giving a narrow reading to the Supreme Court’s decision.72 But on 
the question of why there is a duty in the first place, the court simply assumes 
it, citing authority back to Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite73 on the need for 
disclosure of conflicts of interest because of their importance to shareholder-
voters. But that assumption is the sort of materiality-duty conflation that 
became bad law in 1980.74 
Perhaps Kas simply missed the duty issue, drawing on a pre-Chiarella 
line of authority without noticing the law’s shift.75 If so, it is wrong. But I 
don’t think it is. The difference is that proxy cases are unique. Often, to be 
sure, the duty to disclose breach-related facts is discernable directly from the 
proxy disclosure rules. Item 5 of the instructions to Schedule 14A requires 
disclosure of the direct or indirect interests of officers and directors in the 
matter to be acted upon.76 However, Kas doesn’t point to Item 5 as a basis for 
the duty, and seems to be assuming something broader. Perhaps the court 
was thinking of the half-truth doctrine.77 It is not easy, however, to argue that 
what is said in a proxy solicitation—that these people are officers and 
directors and they recommend the transaction—is misleading for failure to 
 
 
 70. See Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 796 (2d Cir. 1979). A similar line involves disclosure 
of pending civil proceedings against managers. See Zell v. InterCapital Income Sec. Inc., 675 F.2d 
1041 (9th Cir. 1982). These cases, of course, can raise hard materiality issues. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. 
Heyman, 724 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1983). In the criminal proceeding context, Item 401 creates a 
reasonably broad line item disclosure duty. See United States v. Yeaman, 194 F.3d 442 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 71. 796 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 72. Id. at 513-14. 
 73. 396 U.S. 375 (1970). 
 74. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 75. For a case that imposes no disclosure obligation with respect to a conflict and that might be 
reflecting such reasoning, see Mendell v. Greenberg, 938 F.2d 1528 (2d Cir. 1990) (en banc). Mendell 
seems to suggest that one has to attack the bona fides of the directors’ recommendation as opposed to 
trying to force disclosure of conflicts. This case is hard to reconcile with the bulk of the case law in 
this area. 
 76. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 5 (2000). Some courts have construed this fairly broadly. E.g., 
SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 310, 314-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
 77. Cf. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. Sec. Litig., [1998 Transfer Binder Supp.] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 90,306 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1998) (using half-truth doctrine to impose duty to disclose 
conflicts in broker-dealer case). 
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disclose a skeleton in the closet. Realistically, these cases involve complete 
omissions, not partial misstatements.  
To find a more broadly based duty to disclose in proxy cases, we need 
only to look to the most fundamental of grounds, emphasized by the 
Supreme Court in Chiarella:78 the fiduciary obligation. Fiduciaries have an 
affirmative duty to disclose all material information in their possession when 
“dealing” with the beneficiaries of that trust.79 Clearly, the rule applies when 
an insider is buying or selling securities, whether from the corporation or in 
the marketplace. No reference to the half-truth doctrine is needed then. And it 
is a small and logical step to extend this to situations where the insiders 
initiate a transaction that requires shareholder approval: for example, any 
fundamental corporate change, so long as shareholder votes are an “essential 
link” in the process. State law, from which courts borrow conceptions of 
fiduciary duty for federal disclosure purposes, is clear about management’s 
fiduciary duty of candor when seeking shareholder consent.80 And this 
includes the election of directors.81 
If all this is right, courts are correct in finding an affirmative disclosure 
obligation relating to such matters as internal misconduct and criminal 
activity in proxy cases, simply upon a showing of materiality.82 The Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit’s otherwise perplexing dicta in Maldonado v. 
 
 
 78. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See, e.g., Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977); Stroud v. Grace, 606 
A.2d 75 (Del. 1992). For a discussion, see Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The 
Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087 (1996). 
 81. See Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135 (Del. 1997). Interestingly, 
although recognizing the fiduciary obligation of disclosure in the election of directors context, Loudon 
then goes on to absolve the directors from liability with respect to allegedly material nondisclosures. 
Id. at 142-43. See also Wolf v. Assaf, No. 15339, 1998 WL 326662 (Del. Ch. June 16, 1998). This 
reasoning should be understood in the context of the state-law nature of the claim. Plaintiffs, by and 
large, were seeking monetary damages, and the court was clearly uncomfortable with this kind of 
derivative “candor” claim as a substitute for addressing the misconduct directly. Persuasive or not, this 
distinction is not relevant to the very different interests at stake in a federal securities claim. Put 
another way, the result in Loudon would be hard to justify were plaintiffs simply challenging the 
election itself. For further discussion, see 1 RODMAN WARD, JR. ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE 
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 212.4 (4th ed. 1999). 
 82. There are courts that have refused to compel disclosure of self-serving misconduct, even in 
proxy cases. E.g., In re Browning-Ferris Indus. Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 830 F. Supp. 361 (S.D. 
Tex. 1993). My sense is that these cases are wrongly decided, though given the confusion in the law, 
the courts should not be blamed too harshly. This might also explain the line of authority begun by 
United States v. Matthews, which rejects a criminal prosecution based on failure to disclose a crime in 
a proxy solicitation. 787 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986). Matthews and its progeny explicitly distinguish the 
criminal from the civil contexts, implying (correctly, in my view) that such a duty might arise in a civil 
case. See Matthews, 787 F.2d at 47. The separate criminal treatment might be justified on Fifth 
Amendment or lenity grounds.  
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Flynn83 that the proxy rules only set a “minimum” for required disclosure 
becomes justifiable. It is also right to impose a fiduciary duty when insiders 
are buying or selling shares under Rule 10b-5 and the 1933 Act liability 
provisions.84 This imposition includes both open market purchases and issuer 
transactions; thus, Franchard, imposing a broad duty to disclose conflicts in 
a registration statement notwithstanding no obvious line-item requirement, is 
justifiable on this basis.85 A key insider benefits from the sale of shares by 
the issuer, and hence is “dealing” with at least potential shareholders in 
initiating a solicitation.86  
On the other hand, this fiduciary duty of disclosure does not apply when 
the insiders are not dealing with shareholders in either of these ways. Absent 
some kind of transactional nexus involving the insider, courts are clear under 
both federal and state law87 that there is no fiduciary duty of candor on an on-
going basis. There is no duty to apprise even trading shareholders of all 
material information simply to rescue them from an ill-advised decision, 
much less apprise nontrading shareholders of garden-variety misconduct so 
that they can seek to remedy it. The law can be rationalized, then, without 
any reference to federalism principles, by saying that when an insider or 
issuer is not transacting in shares or seeking shareholders’ votes, a duty to 
disclose arises only if there really was a half-truth. That is, management in 
nonproxy cases has to make statements that truly are misleading before it has 
a duty to reveal the facts relating to a possible fiduciary breach.  
This approach reconciles the case law fairly nicely, if not perfectly. Most 
interestingly, it leaves the SEC nearly unlimited freedom to pursue 
undisclosed fiduciary breaches. The Commission can bring cases under Rule 
14a-9 and bootstrap the fiduciary duty of disclosure when the line item 
instructions do not suffice. The Franchard theory remains viable in the 1933 
Act context because of the sale to investors that is involved.88 Outside of the 
“dealing with shareholders” setting, however, the Commission must be more 
careful to articulate a duty, and should rewrite Part IV of Regulation S-K if it 
wants issuers and managers to address a subject more extensively than a 
 
 
 83. 597 F.2d 789, 796 (2d Cir. 1979). This also helps make sense out of Weisberg v. Coastal 
States Gas Corp., 609 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 84. See Shell Petroleum Inc. v. Smith, 606 A.2d 112 (Del. 1992) (short-form merger). 
 85. 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964). 
 86. The Supreme Court in Chiarella was fairly clear that the fiduciary obligation of disclosure is 
owed to investors who by the transaction become shareholders of the corporation. 445 U.S. 222 
(1980). 
 87. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998). 
 88. In the context of a private placement, see United States v. Peterson, 101 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 
1996). 
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natural reading of the instructions would permit. In other words, the filing of 
a 10-K or 10-Q should not alone trigger a fiduciary-based duty to disclose all 
material information relating to managerial breaches of the duty of loyalty. 
The half-truth doctrine becomes the only plausible recourse in those kinds of 
cases. 
3. Care 
A fair number of securities law cases try to bootstrap breach of duty of 
care claims, presumably to avoid the business judgment rule and procedural 
roadblocks under state law. Often citing Santa Fe, courts are strongly 
disposed to dismiss these. One obvious barrier in a Rule 10b-5 case is 
scienter: negligence cases are not cognizable under that Rule, and negligence 
is the typical claim in a duty of care setting. This place is also where 
plaintiffs often get tripped up making “self-accusation” claims.  
However, opportunities for artful pleading are not entirely foreclosed by 
these limitations, at least when a duty to disclose can be located. Take, for 
example, a case like Smith v. Van Gorkom,89 the best known of Delaware’s 
duty of care cases. The self-accusation/motivation problem could be avoided 
by claiming not that the board failed to disclose its own foolishness, but that 
the board failed to disclose particular facts that would lead a reasonable 
shareholder to infer the foregone opportunities to seek a better price. Indeed, 
the Delaware Supreme Court found that the company’s disclosures were not 
candid. Scienter could be shown insofar as the disregard rose to the level of 
subjective recklessness (something indistinct from the Delaware court’s 
finding of “gross procedural negligence”). Yet one is hard pressed to identify 
a significant case ever won by plaintiffs on these sorts of grounds under Rule 
10b-5. 
In cases where shareholder votes are solicited for a particular proposal, as 
in Van Gorkom, Rule 14a-9 makes a duty of care claim even easier. Most 
courts, presently at least, seem to accept negligence as the proper state of 
mind standard.90 Problems relating to “who can sue” are largely resolved in 
plaintiffs’ favor by liberal reliance standards.91 If the shareholder vote, 
moreover, is an essential link in the transaction, “transaction” causation is (or 
at least should not be) a problem. Hence it should be possible to plead such 
 
 
 89. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). The case I am imagining is one brought by trading shareholders, 
rather than preexisting ones. 
 90. E.g., Herskowitz v. Nutri/System Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 189-90 (3d Cir. 1988); Gould v. Am.-
Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1976). 
 91. See Stahl v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp., 967 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1992); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite 
Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). 
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cases successfully. Yet, even here it is hard to find examples of successful 
claims by plaintiffs where the allegations go simply to breaches of care.  
A familiar subcategory of duty of care cases involves failures of 
oversight, by negligence or deliberate disinterest. This subcategory was part 
of Franchard, where even the SEC backed off of insisting on any form of 
director self-accusation (though it did not excuse the failure to disclose the 
underlying facts, which dealt with the duty of loyalty by a controlling 
shareholder).92 There has been a fair amount of litigation since then where 
plaintiffs accuse directors of failing to uncover some kind of wrongdoing by 
others. The hook for federal jurisdiction is typically that these directors stood 
for re-election without disclosure of their nonfeasance. Again, these cases 
almost always fail,93 though often the reason relates to loss causation (a 
matter not of interest in SEC actions): there is no showing of proximate cause 
between the election and any loss to the shareholders.94  
Santa Fe has had a great influence in this setting. Courts have not wanted 
to create too easy an end run around the business judgment rule. But it would 
be a mistake to assume that the SEC’s hands are tied completely as a result. 
The best way to test this would be to pose the problem in terms of a classic 
state law allegation of a breach of the duty to monitor. A good example 
would be a case such as In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative 
Litigation,95 which involved director nondiscovery of illegal activities 
regarding fraudulent Medicare and other claims. We should be clear, of 
course, that an action by the SEC against the company would raise different 
(and usually not terribly difficult) issues. As we have seen, nondisclosure of 
pervasive illegality is material, and often in breach of some duty. Our 
question here is simply whether the directors themselves could be implicated 
for their nonfeasance, which would indeed go to a crucial question in the 
world of corporate accountability. The SEC’s position in the W.R. Grace 
action was that knowing toleration by a director of an apparently misleading 
disclosure is actionable, though the Commission did not bother to say on 
what grounds and seemed to take pains to avoid litigating the issue, even in-
house.96 Here, we are dealing with the harder problem of negligence or 
inattention. 
We need to distinguish between two litigation options. One, as in 
 
 
 92. 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964). 
 93. E.g., Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1364-65 (N.D. Tex. 1979). 
 94. See General Elec. Co. v. Cathcart, 980 F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 95. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). There were indeed federal securities lawsuits arising out of 
these facts. E.g., Isquith v. Caremark Int’l, Inc., 136 F.3d 531 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 96. See supra note 27. 
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Franchard, is saying that there was nondisclosure of the fact of (or facts 
underlying) the inattention. This option stretches the law, although it is not 
entirely implausible to say, for example, that a reasonable investor deciding 
how to vote would find important that persons they elected did nothing when 
faced with a specific set of described facts.97 If nondisclosure of a criminal 
misconduct could be a violation in this context, it is hard to see, conceptually, 
why nondisclosure of a fairly egregious example of ignoring red flags could 
not be. But again, there is little case law to support this. 
That, however, is not terribly important, because there is a simpler way to 
go. The SEC, at least, can simply charge the negligent director with 
participation in the company’s breach. There are a number of routes that are 
open. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act permits SEC actions based on 
negligence.98 Remedially, a cease and desist order could be issued without a 
showing of scienter so long as the director could be said to have “caused” the 
violation. The key, as in Grace, is articulating a duty. Those directors who 
signed the filing that omitted the key information might well be said to be 
primarily involved, and there is now case law support for such a view.99 In 
the absence of a signature, there would have to be an even stronger 
articulation of the view that a director’s role in disclosure involves a fairly 
intense duty of inquiry—a right to rely on other corporate officials, modified 
by a need to assure that they are doing their jobs in a well-designed reporting 
environment. This approach would nicely federalize the Caremark issue, 
assuming the materiality of the misconduct elsewhere within the corporation. 
While such requirement would no doubt provoke a Santa Fe-type protest of 
undue incursion into corporate governance, it is hard to see that the specific 
elements of a solid securities law claim would be lacking. It would be that 
much easier if the SEC could tie the nonfeasance to an absence of a 
reasonable internal accounting control system. 
Thus, there is legal room to expand the pursuit of accountability 
notwithstanding the hostility that courts have shown in private class or 
derivative actions. Having said this, however, I should make clear that I 
would tread gently here for pragmatic reasons.100 One of the great difficulties 
 
 
 97. Perhaps somewhat analogous is McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc., 900 
F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1990), where the court found a misrepresentation when outside directors were 
described as independent without disclosure of the fact that they consistently voted in support of 
management. 
 98. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980). The SEC might also charge the director as a 
controlling person under section 20(a). Some courts insist on recklessness or some sort of “culpable 
participation” in the wrongdoing, however. 
 99. See Howard v. Everex Systems, Inc., 228 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 100. This point is made more fully in Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate 
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with respect to director oversight responsibility is that, in the abstract, we can 
define all sorts of things that directors should pay more attention to. As legal 
exposure grows with respect to particular items, the resulting anxiety is likely 
to crowd out other, perhaps more, useful activities that directors perform. 
Moreover, a piling up of legally imposed responsibilities runs the risk of 
undermining the legitimacy of the laws’ demands, making them appear 
thoughtless and unfair. This effect, in turn, may actually reduce compliance 
in the absence of a high threat of enforcement. In sum, in this area norms and 
other nonlegal influences should do most of the work. The Commission 
could act more aggressively in pursuit of corporate accountability in 
promoting the duty of care, but probably should not. 
4. Mergers and Acquisitions 
The foregoing discussion of fiduciary breaches—and the importance of 
distinguishing clearly between materiality and duty issues—helps clarify 
some interesting case law in the mergers and acquisitions area, where Santa 
Fe is also frequently cited. Quite simply, in negotiated transactions where 
shareholder approval is necessary, there should be (and the case law is fairly 
consistent in demanding) a duty for the initiating management to disclose all 
material information, without regard to specific instructions or the half-truth 
doctrine. Santa Fe should have no influence so long as the nondisclosure 
claim is sufficiently factual, rather than demanding a legal conclusion.101 A 
harder question, but a very narrow one, is what the consequences are if 
shareholder votes are not necessary. This question resembles the issue in 
Goldberg, and will no doubt split the courts along the same lines. Santa Fe 
could plausibly be invoked to support either conclusion.102 
A very recent case from the Second Circuit, Minzer v. Keegan,103 nicely 
illustrates the impotence of Santa Fe-reasoning in this context. The issuer 
and another company, both banking institutions, agreed to a merger. While 
the negotiations were on-going, a third party expressed a serious interest in 
doing the deal instead, at a better price. It was rebuffed, and allegedly never 
(unlike the preferred party) given an opportunity to do the due diligence 
 
 
Boards: Law, Norms and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 797 (2001). 
 101. Thus, for example, the stringent insistence on disclosures of all conflicts of interest. See TSC 
Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 390 U.S. 375 (1970). 
 102. See Wilson v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 855 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1988); supra notes 60-62. 
 103. 218 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1190 (2001). In the interest of full 
disclosure, I should say that I assisted counsel for the plaintiffs in unsuccessfully seeking a writ of 
certiorari in Minzer. 
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required to make a firm bid significantly above the price being offered by the 
other. Plaintiffs, who brought a case under Rule 14a-9, alleged that the 
reason for the lack of interest was that the first party had committed to 
lucrative employment contracts for the issuer’s senior management, while the 
new bidder made clear that it would not do the same. What we have, then, is 
a classic case of management allegedly placing its thumb on the scales to 
favor a bidder in a takeover battle based on its own self-interest. 
Yet clearly, it is also properly brought in federal court, Santa Fe 
notwithstanding, so long as the facts about the third party’s interest were 
material and nondisclosed or (as plaintiffs claimed here) actually 
misrepresented.104 Materiality seems clear, for it goes both to a conflict of 
interest and the possibility that the company was worth more than the 
favored bidder was offering.  
What is interesting is that Judge Winter is troubled by this outcome; he 
cites Santa Fe out of frustration, making clear that he would rather this be a 
state law case.105 Yet he does not affirm the district court’s dismissal on 
materiality because, one suspects, he saw that this was properly pleaded as a 
truth-telling case in a setting where shareholders are owed full disclosure, 
even though it was also about a classic allegation of lack of managerial 
accountability to shareholder interests. Judge Winter does affirm, however, 
on the strange grounds that rational shareholders would have voted to accept 
management’s allegedly inferior proposal even if told the truth.106 
Shareholders would have felt incapable of forcing management to pursue the 
better deal. Thus, even if there was a violation of Rule 14a-9, “transaction 
causation” was lacking. Judge Winter failed to appreciate the inconsistency 
of this holding with Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,107 which rejects exactly 
this kind of “shareholders would have voted for it anyway” objection. That 
he was forced to engage in it in the first place, it seems, is ample testimony to 
the fragility of Santa Fe in the face of a well-pleaded complaint. 
In hostile takeover battles, on the other hand, the scope of the disclosure 
duty is much narrower. At least in all-cash deals, there is no fiduciary 
relationship running from the bidder to the target shareholders. In additiion, 
the target company is not trading with its shareholders or seeking their 
consent. Thus, the scope of affirmative disclosure obligations imposed by 
 
 
 104. The proxy statement stated that the third party “withdrew” from the bidding, omitting that it 
did so only when rebuffed from being given the opportunity for due diligence that had been given to 
the other side.  
 105. Id. at 151. 
 106. Id. at 152. 
 107. 396 U.S. 375 (1970). 
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sections 14(d) and (e) and Rule 10b-5 is narrower: the parties must make 
their required disclosures and must refrain from lying or telling half truths in 
what they do say. However, there is no liability for remaining silent 
regarding some alleged breach, unless and until the subject of the breach is 
“in play” so as to trigger the half-truth doctrine. One of the strongest 
endorsements of the federalism principle, Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.,108 
is filled with ideological rhetoric, but, read carefully, need not stand for much 
more than this. This point is reinforced by noting that if the incumbent 
managers actually lie to trading investors about their motivations in taking 
some action, that lie will (and should) be actionable under section 14(e) or 
Rule 10b-5.109 
5. Financial Fraud and Earnings Management 
An important subject, to which we shall return in the next Part, is whether 
corporate managers are under excessive pressure to manage earnings, leading 
them to make inappropriate or overly aggressive accounting judgments fit the 
financial figures (especially earnings) within Wall Street’s expectations. 
Recent work is abundant that details the incentive structure and rewards of so 
doing, reinforcing the perception that this is indeed a serious issue.110 
At first glance, it is hard to see a Santa Fe type issue here when fraud is 
alleged, for we are dealing with the heart of financial disclosure. But Santa 
Fe’s echoes are discernable on issues such as SAB 99,111 which expands the 
definition of materiality to extend to quantitatively immaterial shadings that 
are done to move the company’s numbers onto target or just above, rather 
than slightly below. From an agency cost perspective, this expansion is 
rightly within the jurisdiction of the SEC. Accounting data is performance 
data, and investors are entitled to use it to set whatever performance 
benchmarks they wish. Shading goes directly to managerial accountability. 
Management has put the issue in play, thereby bringing with it the issue of 
integrity. In sum, as the Second Circuit recently said in Ganino v. Citizens 
 
 
 108. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981). 
 109. See In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236 (3d Cir. 1989); Fry v. Trump, 681 F. 
Supp. 252 (D.N.J. 1988). 
 110. E.g., Francois Degeorge et al., Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds, 72 J. BUS. 1 
(1999) (market expectations); Ron Kasznik, On the Association Between Voluntary Disclosure and 
Earnings Management, 37 J. ACCT. RES. 57 (1999) (market expectations); Charles M. Yablon & 
Jennifer Hill, Timing Corporate Disclosures to Maximize Performance-Based Remuneration: A Case 
of Misaligned Incentives?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 83 (2000) (compensation effects).  
 111. Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 75,563, at 64,087 (Aug. 12, 
1999). 
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Utilities Co.,112 shading readily satisfies both the materiality and duty prongs 
of any securities law claim. 
Another recent case that indirectly offers support for a broad 
“management integrity” scope to the duty to disclose truthful financial 
information is AUSA Life Insurance Co. v. Ernst & Young.113 AUSA 
purchased notes from a company, JWP, and, pursuant to the purchase 
agreement, received financial statements certified by Ernst & Young. The 
statements were false, although not in ways that at the time affected JWP’s 
cash flow (the matter of interest to the debtholders). Instead, the falsifications 
were directed mainly at the company’s equity investors, for they had a 
material impact on reported earnings.114 The ensuing case did not question 
either duty or materiality: they were both present. Rather, the issue was 
causation (in this case, unlike Minzer,115 “loss causation”).116 JWP became 
insolvent after making a disastrous acquisition, which occurred after the 
debtholders had invested and was not itself concealed.117 In a fascinating 
dissent, Judge Winter observed that one way the financials were material to 
the noteholders, so that they were deceived in a meaningful way, is that the 
falsifications created extra pressure for management to avoid subsequent 
discovery, which would most readily be done by engaging in high risk 
actions such as the acquisition in question. Thus, he found loss causation.118 
His opinion is an insightful recognition of the ways in which disclosure 
seamlessly becomes a basis, ex ante, for addressing agency cost problems. 
C. Summary 
We can summarize all of the foregoing along the following lines. The 
factual elements underlying a breach of fiduciary duty have to be disclosed 
under the federal securities laws, Santa Fe notwithstanding, when they are: 
(a) material; and 
(b) (1) required by a line-item instruction; 
 (2) necessary to make a statement by or on behalf of the issuer not 
misleading; or 
 
 
 112. 228 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 113. 206 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 114. Id. at 204-07. 
 115. 218 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 116. AUSA, 206 F.3d at 207. 
 117. Id. at 206. 
 118. Id. at 229-31. 
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  (3) related to a transaction in which the corporation or its 
shareholders are owed a fiduciary duty of candor. 
While the limitations built into this structure (for example, the absence of 
a general duty of candor even in the absence of transacting with 
shareholders) might be justified on federalism-type principles, they need not 
be. This structure derives logically from principles underlying the affirmative 
duty to disclose that has evolved under the securities laws without conscious 
reference to such principles. 
This idea is an important point in terms of the SEC’s interests. In essence, 
Santa Fe is invoked as a restraint mainly in those cases in which it is 
superfluous. The law is reasonably consistent then that when a duty to 
disclose otherwise exists, there is no federalism bar raised by the fact that the 
subject matter is a fiduciary breach, so long as it is material and styled in 
terms of undisclosed facts rather than motivation or legal conclusion. That 
said, because the SEC has so much rulemaking control over the duty issue, 
its freedom to operate in this area is extremely broad. 
Santa Fe’s shadow, therefore, is much more an ideological projection 
than a doctrinal reality. The courts that continue to espouse it are doing so in 
dicta because they want a world of weak federal corporate law. If the 
Commission is afraid of the shadow, it should not be. The new learning on 
corporate accountability implies a greater role for disclosure rules as a means 
of constraining fiduciary misconduct. If the Commission proves that it can 
carry out this mission efficiently, there is little merit to the claim that its 
hands should be tied. 
III. OTHER LIMITS ON THE SEC’S EFFECTIVENESS: RESOURCES AND 
HUMAN NATURE 
The foregoing study of the SEC’s authority to pursue breaches of 
fiduciary duty indicates that there are surprisingly few limits on the reach of 
the Commission. In other words, the securities laws should operate as a 
strong deterrent to hidden breaches of duty, especially those involving some 
form of self-dealing. Further, given the relative historic success of the U.S. 
capital markets, we should not be overly concerned about the current state of 
affairs. We should also keep in mind the strength of the nonlegal forces: 
reputation, norms and culture, and product market incentives that motivate 
managers to act in a manner reasonably consonant with the desires of their 
shareholders.119 Nonetheless, there is a persistent (and probably realistic) fear 
 
 
 119. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253 
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that agency costs continue to be problematic in U.S.-based corporations, and 
leads us to two questions. First, why might our disclosure regime, in 
connection with the concurrent system of state corporate law and nonlegal 
incentives, be less than fully effective in controlling agency costs? Second, 
and more importantly, how might the SEC act strategically to improve the 
situation? Here, we move from questions of doctrine to questions of 
implementation. 
A. Limited Resources and Limited Remedies 
The obvious starting point, perhaps an answer in and of itself to any 
perceived deterrence deficiency, is the SEC’s lack of enforcement resources. 
Enforcement personnel are spread thin not only among investigations and 
actions involving managerial accountability, but numerous other matters, 
such as the conduct of the securities industry and its associated persons. The 
numbers are only part of the story. SEC enforcement lawyers are underpaid, 
leading to high rates of turnover. This high rate of turnover, in turn, means a 
loss of experience and expertise, a large burden given the resources and 
talent typically on the other side of an important enforcement matter. The 
consequence is far fewer investigations and enforcement actions than 
optimal, and a pressure to settle rather than take a case through an expensive 
trial, meaning that the terms of settlement sometimes end up being fairly 
generous to the defendants. In a rational world, at least, this 
underenforcement is not lost on the managerial community. This problem is 
so overwhelming that it is difficult to say something meaningful about it 
other than the obvious; the Commission deserves far more resources than it 
has.  
Further, the remedies available to the Commission when it brings a case 
do not have enough of a deterrence element built in. While the SEC can get 
disgorgement of gains made possible by a breach of candor, it is less clear 
that this kind of relief will be granted when the breach occurs after the fact 
(such as, a failure to disclose the transaction in a 10-K). Civil penalties have 
helped, but it would take more than the current scale to create a measure 
appropriate to compensate for the likely underdetection of offenses. Pursuing 
large penalties, especially against the natural persons who caused the 
violations, also tends to provoke a vigorous defense, running counter to the 
desire to achieve high levels of settlement. Nor have the courts been 
particularly helpful. For example, with respect to the officer and director bar 
 
 
(1999); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the 
Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619 (2001). 
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authority that Congress granted the SEC in 1990, one can readily assume that 
any CEO who deliberately engineers a significant securities fraud deserves 
for that reason alone (absent some strong shareholder-oriented justification) 
to be removed from his job. However, the courts have superimposed 
additional requirements that make such an order far more difficult to 
obtain.120 What would have been a strong threat becomes more muted. 
The SEC, of course, has lacked resources and remedies since its 
inception. Thus it has developed a set of techniques by which it tries to 
leverage what it has. One of these is to try to create an inflated impression of 
the threat of action. This leveraging is no doubt part of the tendency to bring 
many cases and settle most, rather than concentrate on fewer and fight 
harder. The Commission also tries to find cases with good publicity value: 
well-known defendants, intriguing facts, and the like. Well-publicized 
enforcement actions can be highly salient, and the investing public and 
business community may overestimate their frequency as a result. Settling or 
bringing a case as an administrative proceeding also reduces the risk of a 
publicized loss in court, something that the SEC seems to fear greatly. 
The Commission has an agent besides the press through which to seek a 
magnification of its message: the legal profession. I have written fairly 
extensively about this and do not wish to repeat myself.121 However, it seems 
clear that the self-interest of the securities bar calls for fairly powerful 
securities regulation and enforcement. Though on the surface they act as 
clients’ advocates for less agency power (for example, taking conservative 
positions on matters such as Santa Fe’s influence), their preference, I 
suspect, would be for the courts not to prune federal (or state) legal authority 
too much. The scarier the legal threat, the more their services are needed and 
the more influence they have over their clients. The savvy securities lawyer 
(or groups acting in concert) will inflate the threat of Commission action at 
the same time that he, she, or they complain about it. As I have suggested 
elsewhere, this process does not necessarily involve any deliberate form of 
bias. Human nature, as will be discussed more fully below, has a remarkable 
ability to lead people to believe that which is in their interest to believe. A 
good example of threat magnification is the W.R. Grace proceeding, noted 
earlier.122 This proceeding was a settled action without any remedy, where 
 
 
 120. See SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995) (insisting on a showing of likelihood of 
repetition). 
 121. See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of 
Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375 (1997); Langevoort, supra note 
100. 
 122. See supra note 27. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p449 Langevoort.doc  12/20/2001   9:06 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
478 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 79:449 
 
 
 
 
the directors in question clearly knew of an omission in a 10-K, though they 
might have had an excuse for not pursuing it. In this “cheap” setting, the 
Commission offered some fairly broad thoughts about the corporate 
governance responsibilities of outside directors to monitor the company’s 
disclosure compliance, at least as it relates to SEC filings.123 When one reads 
the resulting trade press commentary (for instance, New York Law Journal, 
Legal Times), the dramatic portrayal of the Commission’s hostile “incursion” 
into corporate governance is fairly striking.124  
Whether the managerial community really becomes more frightened as a 
result of this message sharpening is not entirely clear: maybe they are savvy 
enough to discount some or all of what their lawyers tell them. I suspect that 
some discounting goes on, but it is not enough to compensate: especially 
when lawyers act in concert to “agree” about an inflated characterization of 
the law. While we cannot measure the extent of the inflation, I suspect that 
there is some, though nowhere near enough to create a level of fear that 
offsets the reality of underenforcement. 
B. Private Securities Litigation 
The conventional line in securities regulation is that private securities 
litigation is a necessary complement to the SEC’s deterrence efforts, in 
addition to serving a compensatory function. The plaintiffs’ bar is a natural 
ally to the Commission, and one that the Commission historically has 
faithfully supported. 
For better or worse, there are doctrinal limits on how much work the 
private bar can do to remedy breaches of fiduciary duty, quite apart from the 
impact of Santa Fe. The “in connection with” requirement and the doctrine 
of loss causation, for example, make it very unlikely that the harm to the 
corporation will be remedied even when there was some undisclosed 
breach.125 The point on which I want to focus, however, is broader. 
Over the last three decades, with increasing intensity, the plaintiffs’ 
securities bar has come under attack as engaging in self-serving behaviors—
particularly, the filing of weak cases for their settlement value—that are 
inconsistent with the investor-protection goals of securities regulation.126 
This “tarring” of the plaintiffs’ bar has been immensely successful. It led 
 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. E.g., Bruce A. Hiler & Ira H. Raphaelson, When Reasonable Reliance Isn’t Enough: The 
Evolving Standards for Board Oversight, INSIGHTS, Jan. 1998, at 2. 
 125. See supra notes 60-62. 
 126. From among the many statements along this line, see Grundfest, supra note 21. 
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Congress to make significant (and probably excessive) reforms in both the 
process and substance of private securities litigation in 1995. Perhaps even 
more powerfully, it has influenced the courts. One cannot read the case law 
under Rule 10b-5 since 1975 without a palpable sense that lawmaking has 
been driven by a fear of speculative litigation that had to be deterred, even at 
the price of making good cases harder to bring. Sometimes the fear has been 
explicit, as in cases like Blue Chip Stamps127 and Central Bank of Denver.128 
Sometimes it is more hidden, as in Gustafson.129 Most potently, perhaps, has 
been its influence in the development of entirely new (or reinvented) 
doctrines under the securities laws. I doubt that we would have the three 
developments that to me, constitute the most interesting substantive change 
in 10b-5 doctrine over the past fifteen years—the “bespeaks caution” 
doctrine,130 the reinvigoration of an extraordinarily powerful “mere puffery” 
defense,131 or the stunning willingness of judges to decide difficult 
materiality issues “as a matter of law”—were it not for the intensity of this 
perception. 
It would be venturing too far from the purposes of this Article to explore 
how justified or unjustified this perception has been or to estimate what 
effect the reforms have had on the deterrence calculus. My beliefs are (1) that 
the fear is partly justified but significantly overstated and (2) that the reforms, 
such as the new pleading standard, have done some damage, but have not 
been debilitating, much less fatal.132 
The question for us is the role of the SEC. Plainly, the Commission has 
suffered from the perception of abuse, and not simply by the cut-back in the 
power of an ally. In the courts, it has to deal with doctrines like puffery and 
bespeaks caution. It is also finding courts using the pre-Reform Act version 
of the “strong inference” pleading standard for securities fraud in SEC 
enforcement cases,133 another doctrinal invention induced by hostility to 
private actions. 
At the risk of judging too much by hindsight, the SEC came much too late 
 
 
 127. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
 128. Central Bank of Denver N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 129. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995). 
 130. See Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures That “Bespeak Caution,” 49 BUS. LAW. 481 (1994). 
 131. See Jennifer O’Hare, The Resurrection of the Dodo: The Unfortunate Re-emergence of the 
Puffery Defense in Private Securities Fraud Actions, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1697 (1998). 
 132. See Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 639 (1996). For an analysis that shares this same perspective, see Charles M. Yablon, A 
Dangerous Supplement? Longshot Claims and Private Securities Litigation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 567 
(2000). 
 133. Compare SEC v. Cassano, 61 F. Supp.2d 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), with SEC v. Drescher, [1999-
2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 90,681 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1999). 
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to the acknowledgement that the incentive structure of private securities 
litigation is such that abuses are indeed plausible, if overstated, and some 
reforms justifiable. Understandably, it stuck by its ally. But that ally was 
losing a battle in both perceptual and real terms, and the Commission could 
perhaps have both protected investor interests better and headed off the 
excessive reaction of Congress and the courts had it taken more initiative in 
the design and endorsement of sensible monitoring devices. In terms of 
message, it needed to make clear to the courts especially, that their “dis-ease” 
was legitimate but needed to be treated in ways that were proportionate and 
did not infect the entirety of the regulatory apparatus. By not doing this, the 
Commission allowed those ideologically opposed to strong securities law to 
associate the abuses of private litigation with the enterprise of securities 
regulation as a whole.134 
That is water over the dam, however. What should the Commission be 
doing today, in the aftermath of excessive pruning? Limited resources make 
this difficult, but the Commission should spend some time and effort 
assuring at least that no further damage is done. Most pointedly, it must 
pursue a message that, possible abuses notwithstanding, there are many good 
cases that are at risk post-reform.135 The best way to do this is to open a 
handful of investigations in cases where private actions have been dismissed, 
or are on the verge of dismissal. Public exposure of these instances should be 
emphasized when they demonstrate the merit of the plaintiffs’ claims. At the 
same time, however, the Commission should be candid if it determines after 
investigation that a case truly was based on little more than speculation—if 
not quite so vigorous in the publicity effort. 
C. Human Nature: The Problem of Earnings Management 
The deficiencies we see in the compliance structure are due primarily to 
insufficient detection and penalty. The law, on the other hand, is quite 
workable. However, we should not assume too easily that the law is all there 
is to the challenge of reducing agency costs via a cluster of disclosure-
oriented strategies. We may have neglected an element of the less-than-
wholly-rational side of human nature, an element to which the SEC has 
historically paid little attention. Many interesting insights can be drawn from 
 
 
 134. For some insightful thoughts on the rhetoric of securities law reform and its impact on the 
business of securities regulation, see James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 
BROOK. L. REV. 3 (1999). 
 135. See Elliott J. Weiss & Janet E. Moser, Enter Yossarian: How to Resolve the Procedural 
Catch-22 That the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Creates, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 457 (1998). 
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the persistent problems relating to earnings management. 
1. Managerial Behavior 
A subject that has fascinated scholars (including me) is why an insider 
would ever risk anything less than candor with the capital marketplace.136 
Even if successful for a time, misrepresentations are usually exposed. Given 
how much the market cares about accurate information, there should be a 
significant penalty to the reputation, and hence earning power, of the 
responsible persons, not to mention the risk of legal exposure. The issuer, 
into which the executive may well have sunk a fair amount of human capital, 
may also be penalized by the markets when it loses credibility. 
There is a rational response that is partially persuasive. Under some 
circumstances, the short-term gain to the insiders is worth whatever risk of 
reputational penalty. Extremely high options grants may make it tempting to 
manipulate earnings, no matter the consequences.137 More significant, 
perhaps, is the so-called “last period” problem. Executives who fear being 
fired for inadequate performance—and the resulting damage to their 
reputations from that event, may face a positive pay-off from strategies that 
cover-up the deficiencies, even if they are eventually discovered. At least 
they will have had their jobs that much longer, and maybe luck would bail 
them out in the meantime. The tougher outside directors become in 
monitoring performance using objective benchmarks, the more likely it is for 
insiders to commit fraud.  
This kind of rational decision making can be countered only by increasing 
either the adverse consequences that come from discovery or the likelihood 
of detection. Here, of course, we return to the problem of resources. It is 
worth asking, however, whether there might be other forces that contribute to 
a decision to shade or manipulate accounting data, such as compliance 
decision making, that are less easy to explain rationally and may not be quite 
so easy to deter even with increased resources. Why, moreover, is the threat 
of moral sanction not a more potent force here? While the truth-telling norm 
may be slipping in strength in today’s society, it is not entirely absent. 
One possibility arises from biases in perception. A financial officer faced 
with highly discretionary judgment calls is more likely to believe that those 
 
 
 136. See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities 
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691; Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers 
Fear a Good Thing is Coming to an End: The Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675 
(1999); Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations 
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997). 
 137. See, e.g., Yablon & Hill, supra note 110, at 85-86. 
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decisions leading to a more positive presentation are realistic than a more 
neutral outsider would. Why? There are a host of psychological properties at 
work here, but they cluster under the heading of self-serving inference. We 
tend to justify, even internally, choices that are in our interest. This effect is 
magnified by optimism, which can be organizationally “conditioned”.138 A 
positive image of the company’s skills and prospects will bias choices on 
such matters as loan loss reserves, customer returns, contingent liabilities, 
and so on. A comparable image of projects in which the company has 
invested will lead to judgments about useful life and other discretionary 
matters that are different from what a more jaundiced view might suggest. 
What is important here is that the views are held in good faith, with no sense 
of any manipulation (and hence no guilt). 
This portrayal captures some of the bias, but not all. Some judgments 
plainly go over the line and will be recognizable, even to the person in 
question, as violating generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). But 
even here, there are strong psychological pressures that lead decent people to 
cut corners without any feeling of guilt, thereby compromising the force of 
any social and moral norms. Again, optimism plays an important role. The 
judgment that the business will prosper with enough time and money, so that 
investors will eventually be thankful, provides an easy moral rationalization 
for short-term falsifications.139 This force is compounded by something that 
cognitive psychologists call the sunk cost trap, a form of cognitive 
dissonance.140 Little by little, financial executives make good faith, but 
overly optimistic, reporting judgments. These accumulate, and some turn of 
events creates the risk that they will be held accountable. The mental 
response is not recognition of the mistake followed by regret, but rather an 
increasingly unrealistic revisionism to justify those choices as ones a 
reasonable person would make. The consequence may well be further pursuit 
of the ill-advised course of reporting judgments, instead of a halt with 
admission of error. Again, until the point at which no alternative explanation 
is plausible, the person resists feeling that he has done something wrong. 
Many of the recently celebrated “cooked-books” allegations (Cendant, 
Microstrategy) could be told by reference to these sorts of cognitive and 
emotional forces, far better than any story of outright moral corruption. 
Certain personality types, such as narcissists, are particularly given to this 
 
 
 138. See Langevoort, supra note 136, at 115-19. 
 139. See David M. Messick & Max H. Bazerman, Ethical Leadership and the Psychology of 
Decision Making, SLOAN MGT. REV., Winter 1996, at 9, 20. 
 140. See, e.g., Barry M. Staw, The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action, 6 ACAD. 
MGT. REV. 577, 578 (1981). 
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sort of thinking, and they frequently come to inhabit high corporate 
offices.141 
Unfortunately, this kind of account plays into the deterrence calculus. 
People who do not recognize that what they are doing is unreasonable do not 
perceive the risk of illegality, even if the threat of detection and punishment 
exists. Even when there is some appreciation that one’s conduct might 
overstep the rules, there is evidence that compliance decisions are heavily 
influenced by a person’s biased comparison of the legitimacy of what they 
are doing vis-à-vis the moral force of the exogenous legal requirement, 
unless the risk of detection and punishment is very high.142 That risk in 
securities law most assuredly is not high, and rationalization can lead to 
violations without substantial guilt. 
2. Market Behavior 
The behavioral traits of corporate managers are not the only unexpected 
influences on the problem of earnings management. Managers are plainly 
responding to the market and its obsession with meeting or beating analyst 
expectations. That the market rewards “meets or beats” and harshly penalizes 
anything short is fairly well-established, especially for growth firms.143 We 
should thus try to understand why it is that short-term numbers, so 
notoriously the product of manipulation, provoke such behavior. 
This question, of course, puts us back into the long-standing debate over 
market efficiency. While rational explanations are possible, an ever 
increasing amount of work points to persistent inefficiencies. Work in 
behavioral finance tries to explain these sorts of things in a way that can be 
tested empirically. One possibility that has been widely explored, for 
example, is that many investors (including some professionals) use only 
easily recognizable figures, like estimated and reported earnings, as bases for 
investment. These are simplifying strategies, and if widely enough used, lead 
to a “herding” in terms of expectations.144 As soon as some negative news is 
released, however, the herd—limited in the depth of research and thus 
 
 
 141. See Michael Maccoby, Narcissistic Leaders, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 69. 
 142. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Tom R. Tyler & 
Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United 
States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703 (1994). 
 143. See, e.g., Degeorge et al., supra note 110, at 5-8. 
 144. For a good discussion, see Claire A. Hill, Why Financial Appearances Might Matter: An 
Explanation for “Dirty Pooling” and Some Other Types of Financial Cosmetics, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
141 (1997). See also D. Eric Hirst & Patrick E. Hopkins, Comprehensive Income Reporting and 
Analysts’ Valuation Judgments, 36 J. ACCT. RES. 47 (1998). 
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lacking confidence in their positions—simply turns in the other direction. 
Another, somewhat related, account focuses on momentum.145 While 
initial reactions to good or bad news may be fairly rational, any trading shift, 
especially in lesser-known growth firms, brings in a group of followers, such 
as, those who trade simply because of the trend, betting on its continuation. 
These traders may be following the market itself, as day-traders do, or 
reacting to the overenthusiasm in media or brokerage reports. Whatever the 
trigger, the follow-up trading creates a self-fulfilling prophecy, moving the 
price further along and thus for a time confirming the suspicions of the 
unsophisticated that their investment choices were wise. A surprising jolt of 
bad news, however, pops the bubble, causing an excessive reversal. 
We could go further with possible explanations, but need not. The 
question that has puzzled theorists is not whether these sorts of behaviors are 
plausible, but why they are not offset by arbitrage activities on the part of the 
truly sophisticated. Here, again, theories abound. One is that arbitrage is too 
risky: the smart money does not know when the reversal will take place. 
Another is that truly smart money may actually want to provoke these kinds 
of bubbles, or at least play along for a time, so long as they feel nimble 
enough to exit before the crowd.146 Especially if those playing this strategy 
are overconfident, one can readily see how their influence will make the 
bubble grow, not restrain it. 
What is the significance of this to the SEC?147 Putting aside the meta-
issue of the value of mandatory disclosure in a highly emotional trading 
environment, we can make a far more simple point. If managers believe that 
markets depart systematically from rationality, overreacting to short-falls 
from earnings estimates, it becomes that much easier to justify to oneself and 
associates a program of earnings manipulation. A fortiori, if the perception 
grows to include manipulative conspiracies (e.g., short-sellers). Indeed, 
managers may systematically come to disbelieve in market efficiency as it 
relates to their stock’s price in part not so much because such belief is well-
grounded, but because it creates that much more psychological freedom to 
engage in self-interested or self-protective behavior. In this sense, there is a 
link between perceptions of the market and undercompliance with the 
securities laws.148 
 
 
 145. See, e.g., Harrison Hong & Jeremy C. Stein, A Unified Theory of Underreaction, Momentum 
Trading, and Overreaction in Asset Markets, 54 J. FIN. 2143 (1999). 
 146. See J. Bradford De Long et al., Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing 
Rational Speculation, 45 J. FIN. 379 (1990). 
 147. See Robert B. Thompson, Securities Regulation in an Electronic Age: The Impact of 
Cognitive Psychology, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 779 (1997). 
 148. For an interesting perspective on the motivations to manipulate accounting data, see Thomas 
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3. Gatekeepers 
The SEC has long recognized the limits on its ability to deter securities 
fraud directly, even if it may not have had a perfect sense of why those limits 
are so powerful. This understanding is why the Commission has tried for so 
long to enlist the cooperation of third parties who have influence over 
corporate insiders to help deter securities fraud. This approach is the well-
known gatekeeper strategy,149 and with respect to on-going corporate 
disclosure, the primary gatekeepers are accountants, lawyers, and outside 
directors. The Commission increased its efforts to have each of these groups 
play a more active monitoring role over insider-generated disclosure, mainly 
by threatening liability consequences against those who fall short.150 
I have written elsewhere in some depth about this kind of strategy as it 
relates to predictable traits of human nature in both lawyers151 and outside 
directors.152 I am unpersuaded that stepped-up liability threats are wise or 
productive except where the outsiders are actually complicit in the fraud. 
Here, briefly, I want to turn to the accountants who audit corporate financial 
statements, especially as it relates to the on-going debate over auditor 
independence. 
Accountants should be good gatekeepers. They are well-trained 
professionals with fairly strong reputational incentives to perform well in the 
auditing task. They also face heavy legal exposure. While the audit function 
can hardly be expected to expose all fraud, it should operate as a powerful 
check on managerial overreaching in a number of settings. This strength 
aside, where is the potential deficiency in auditors’ performance? 
A standard answer is lack of independence, something addressable by 
definitonal rulemaking of the sort recently completed by the SEC.153 
Nonaudit sources of income from the firm being audited can surely alter the 
mix of financial incentives that accountants face. Without doubting the 
relevance of this, however, I suspect that the real source of pressure on 
 
 
Lys & Margaret Neale, Relative Reality, CHIEF EXEC., Dec. 1996, at 72. 
 149. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement 
Strategy, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986); Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gate?: A Proposal for a 
Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH U. L.Q.  491 (2001). 
 150. Both the audit committee rules, supra note 23, and the W.R. Grace proceeding, supra note 
27, are illustrations of this strategy in operation. 
 151. See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers’ 
Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75 (1993). 
 152. See Langevoort, supra note 100. 
 153. See Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, Exchange Act 
Release No. 43,602, [2000-01 Tr. Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,406, at 83, 989 (Nov. 15, 
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auditors is subconscious and derives from two sources. One, on which the 
SEC heard testimony during its auditor independence hearings, is self-
serving inference.154 Auditors are hired by management, normally, and 
interact closely with them. Their preference is to please the managers, which 
can bias judgment in close-call situations. The other is the commitment bias, 
and grows from the first: once judgments are made that are biased toward 
management, probably quite innocently, a strong pressure arises to justify 
those choices in the face of new information that calls into doubt the wisdom 
of the prior decisions. Slowly, and without conscious realization, the auditor 
becomes co-opted into the pattern of decision and loses the ability to resist. 
Neither of these kinds of biases is unusual in business settings, and the 
solutions are fairly obvious.155 Self-serving inference is dealt with by altering 
the chain in command; auditors should be hired and monitored by the audit 
committee of the board. Commitment biases are dealt with by rotation of 
personnel and intensive peer review, though this can be quite expensive. 
While each has been the subject of regulatory attention, the SEC and its allies 
in the accounting profession have stopped short of demanding them. This 
lack of action may be politically wise for the SEC because such issues, if 
pushed to their logical conclusion, would probably dwarf the “nonaudit fee” 
issue in controversy while nevertheless leaving in place a natural limit on the 
ability of the audit to be an effective restraint on managerial opportunism. 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE POLITICAL AND EXPRESSIVE FUNCTIONS 
OF THE SEC 
We can bundle all of the foregoing together by saying this: The securities 
laws do provide a potentially powerful mechanism for controlling agency 
costs. However, limited resources, in terms of the SEC’s ability to investigate 
and enforce, and deficiencies in the ancillary system of private enforcement, 
some systemic and others imposed by the judiciary and Congress, limit the 
effectiveness of this form of control. Furthermore, predictable features of 
human nature frustrate some of the deterrence strategies that the Commission 
 
 
 154. See Robert A. Prentice, The SEC and MDP: Implications of the Self-Serving Bias for 
Independent Auditing, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1597 (2000). For a comprehensive analysis of biases that 
auditors might fall prey to, see Robert Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral 
Insight into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133 (2000). See also Max H. Bazerman et 
al., The Impossibility of Auditor Independence, SLOAN MGT. REV., Summer 1997, at 89; Mark W. 
Nelson & William R. Kenney, Jr., The Effect of Ambiguity on Loss Contingency Reporting Judgments, 
72 ACCT. REV. 257 (1997).  
 155. See Chip Heath et al., Cognitive Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can Compensate 
for Individual Shortcomings, 20 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 1 (1998). 
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tries to implement. 
These limitations mean that the SEC has to fight its battles through more 
than rulemaking and enforcement actions. In this conclusion, we need to 
think about the expressive nature of what the Commission does—influencing 
key constituencies by the expression of ideas, through persuasion as distinct 
from compulsion. The more politically savvy SEC chairmen, commissioners, 
and staff appreciate this expressive function, though they may have defined it 
too narrowly. That is the dilemma with which I want to end this Article. The 
primary political mission of the SEC is to gain resources. Given the current 
dearth of resources, that mission should not be denigrated. The primary giver 
of resources is Congress. In this sense, the Commission’s political task is 
most obviously a search for popular and/or institutional support that can lead 
key members of Congress to want to favor stronger rather than weaker 
securities regulation.  
The brand image it has utilized, more clearly under Arthur Levitt than any 
recent chairman, is that of the “investor’s champion.” That is, close alliance 
with the interests of individual investors, and the inculcation that there are 
serious battles within the world of investing at which the “little guy” is at a 
fatal disadvantage without powerful federal help. Given the tilt in the 
preference toward individual vis-à-vis intermediated investing in the 1990s (a 
trend that may or may not continue), that emphasis seems fairly savvy. 
The message is communicated in many ways. Some are direct, such as 
web sites, investor town meetings and education, speeches, and rulemaking 
initiatives, all accompanied with aggressive publicity. Others are more subtle. 
I have written elsewhere that the campaign against insider trading is the 
quintessential form of advertising designed to reinforce the underlying brand 
message: it offers highly resonant and compelling images (greed and hubris) 
and demands behavior that people love to insist on in others (restraint and 
fiduciary responsibility).156 It is to the SEC what the Clydesdale beer wagon 
is to Budweiser and probably has helped the Commission gain a supranormal 
level of public support and more resources than it would have otherwise. The 
“investor’s champion” brand message is also effective with another key 
constituency, the SEC’s own staff. It is a motivator and a source of internal 
cohesion for what is widely regarded as a first-rate governmental agency. 
Over the past decade, the Commission has been “on message” fairly 
consistently. Regulation FD probably was the rhetorical high point,157 but 
 
 
 156. See Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider 
Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319 (1999). 
 157. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, 65 C.F.R. 
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there have been many others. One of the more subtle themes of the 1990s 
was the Commission’s fight against the growth of private securities markets 
and transactional forms that, however efficient, would not be open to the 
smaller investor and hence threaten a deterioration of the broad public 
markets.  
My claim here is not that this message is wrong. It’s risky, however. As 
negotiators know, a truly hard line, adversarial approach risks alienating the 
other side (securities professionals, institutions, and so forth), and these 
groups are not without political power of their own. It may provoke an 
overreaction when the political winds shift. But that is not the main point 
either. Rather, excessive faith in this one message makes it less likely that the 
Commission will succeed in some of the more subtle ideological and 
normative battles that it faces, including promoting managerial accountability 
in an atmosphere of scarce resources.  
One example of this was raised earlier. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
the courts redesigned the substantive antifraud protections in a way that was 
far from favorable to the individual investor. I suspect that the SEC abetted 
this in two respects. First, it left Rule 10b-5 untouched, allowing the courts 
the freedom to reinterpret it without authoritative agency guidance. The 
Commission remained wedded to an image—that it did not want to provide a 
blueprint for fraud and wanted the freedom to employ creative arguments for 
expanding its scope—that derived from a time when the courts were indeed 
the Commission’s loyal allies.158 Second, it remained committed for too long 
to an absolutist alliance with the private securities bar, identifying individual 
investor interests with vigorous class action litigation. This focus took away 
the Commission’s ability to enter into a constructive dialog with the courts 
over ways to deal with their concerns about litigation excess in a way that 
would not threaten the substance of securities law enforcement. The courts, 
predictably, overreacted. The remnants of Santa Fe as an explicit critique of 
securities laws’ role in agency cost reduction ought be vigorously and 
confidently countered on the merits, lest the courts persist in seeing—under 
the influence of rent-seekers on the other side—securities fraud enforcement 
as an outmoded form of old-style regulation.159 
 
 
 158. The open-endedness of Rule 10b-5 is not an irrational thing for the SEC to try to preserve; 
losses can be recouped later on because of the flexibility of the rule. However, by continuing to hew to 
the standard lines it had always expressed, the Commission seemed to ignore the conservative forces 
that were, at least temporarily, pushing the law in the wrong way. 
 159. See Cox, supra note 134. 
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The judiciary is one audience to whom the SEC must learn to speak more 
persuasively, and the simple brand message will no longer do. Another 
audience, readily underestimated, is the business community. As we saw 
toward the end of this paper, compliance in a low-enforcement environment 
is a function of the perceived legitimacy of the legal rules in question. An “us 
versus them” message about the nature of securities regulation alienates 
“them”. Predictably, the investors’ champion message is reinterpreted within 
the business community as insensitivity to legitimate (if, perhaps, self-
servingly interpreted) corporate needs. While the task of regulation inevitably 
provokes this sort of reaction, its intensity varies, and the presentation of the 
message can at least moderate it, especially among those not directly 
suspected of wrongdoing. Here, I will offer a critique of Regulation FD in 
terms of style, if not substance. At its core, the rule makes a great deal of 
economic sense. Selective disclosure has a skewing effect on markets and is 
plainly a form of insider trading, except possibly for the way the Supreme 
Court has designed the prevailing doctrine.160 However, the breadth with 
which Regulation FD was drafted and its egalitarian rhetoric guaranteed a 
spiteful response from many in the business and legal communities. Without 
the resources to fight aggressively, the Commission has to be concerned with 
moral persuasion, and it should not confuse repetition of its historic brand 
message with something that resonates within the community of the 
regulated. It should not compromise on what is truly essential, but should be 
careful about the claims that it makes when it desires adherence. 
Can the conventional brand message possibly be restyled? I would not 
abandon it entirely by any means: it has a history and an appeal. But it can 
and should be refurbished to incorporate some of the ideas from the recent 
renaissance of appreciation for securities regulation with which we began this 
Article. Securities regulation is a successful method for controlling agency 
costs: by exposing the “lemons” in the market basket via well-enforced 
disclosure requirements, it creates an environment in which both markets and 
the better issuers and managers can flourish.161 It exists not as a populist 
mechanism to give investors more power as against managers collectively, 
but as a powerful way of separating the sweet corporate fruit from the sour. 
 
 
 160. See Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA. L. 
REV. 1023 (1990). 
 161. As one practical suggestion, I would use more carrots in place of sticks. For example, I 
would cap corporate damages for securities fraud upon a showing of a well-designed, well-
implemented disclosure compliance system that was nonetheless frustrated by one or two corrupt 
managers—a regime not unlike the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines under federal criminal 
law—rather than seek penalties against the noncomplicit directors who, in hindsight, failed to monitor 
well enough. See Langevoort, supra note 10, at 57-58. 
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Without overstating the point, this version of what securities regulation is 
about—which has been heard from time to time, but far too softly—has the 
virtue of being both intellectually current and potentially resonant among a 
wider set of audiences. 
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